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Abstract:  
The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when 
the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-
consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any 
beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to 
be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the 
degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-
dependent than if rational expectations are assumed. 
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 An extensive literature has considered the optimal conduct of monetary policy
under the assumption of rational (or model-consistent) expectations. This literature
has found that it is quite important to take account of the e®ects of the systematic
(and hence predictable) component of monetary policy on expectations. For example,
it is found quite generally that an optimal policy commitment di®ers from the policy
that would be chosen through a sequential optimization procedure with no advance
commitment of future policy. It is also found quite generally that optimal policy is
history-dependent | a function of past conditions that no longer a®ect the degree
to which it would be possible to achieve stabilization aims from the present time
onward.1
Both of these conclusions, however, depend critically on the idea that an ad-
vance commitment of future policy should change people's expectations at earlier
dates. This may lead to the fear that analyses that assume rational expectations
(RE) exaggerate the degree to which a policy authority can rely upon private-sector
expectations to be shaped by its policy commitments in precisely the way that it
expects them to be. What if the relation between what a central bank plans to do
and what the public will expect to happen is not quite so predictable? Might both
the case for advance commitment of policy and the case for history-dependent policy
be considerably weakened under a more skeptical view of the precision with which
the public's expectations can be predicted?
One way of relaxing the assumption of rational expectations is to model agents as
forecasting using an econometric model, the coe±cients of which they must estimate
using data observed prior to some date; sampling error will then result in forecasts
that depart somewhat from precise consistency with the analyst's model.2 However,
selecting a monetary policy rule on the basis of its performance under a speci¯c model
of \learning" runs the risk of exaggerating the degree to which the policy analyst
can predict and hence exploit the forecasting errors that result from a particular
way of extrapolating from past observations. One might even conclude that the
optimal policy under learning achieves an outcome better than any possible rational-
expectations equilibrium, by inducing systematic forecasting errors of a kind that
happen to serve the central bank's stabilization objectives. But if such a policy were
shown to be possible under some model of learning considered to be plausible (or
1Both points are discussed extensively in Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
2Examples of monetary policy analysis under assumptions of this kind about private-sector ex-
pectations include Orphanides and Williams (2005a, 2005b) and Gaspar et al. (2005).
1even consistent with historical data), would it really make sense to conduct policy
accordingly, relying on the public to continue making precisely the mistakes that the
policy is designed to exploit?
It was exactly this kind of assumption of superior knowledge on the part of the
policy analyst that the rational expectations hypothesis was intended to prevent.
Yet as just argued, the assumption of RE also implies an extraordinary ability on
the part of the policy analyst to predict exactly what the public will be expecting
when policy is conducted in a particular way. In this paper, I propose instead an
approach to policy analysis that does not assume that the central bank can be certain
exactly what the public will expect if it chooses to conduct policy in a certain way.
Yet neither does it neglect the fact that people are likely to catch on, at least to
some extent, to systematic patterns created by policy, in analyzing the e®ects of
alternative policies. In this approach, the policy analyst assumes that private-sector
expectations should not be too di®erent from what her model would predict under
the contemplated policy | people are assumed to have near-rational expectations
(NRE). But it is recognized that a range of di®erent beliefs would all qualify as NRE.
The policymaker is then advised to choose a policy that would not result in too bad
an outcome under any NRE, i.e., a robustly optimal policy given the uncertainty
about private-sector expectations.3
1 Near-Rational Expectations
I can expound the general conception of robust policy that I wish to propose using an
abstract two-period policy game. A vector of endogenous variables xt is determined
in two successive periods (t = 0;1); there are many possible states of the world s
in period 1, and x1 may depend on s. The policymaker chooses a vector of controls
ut in each period; the value of u1 may be contingent on the state s. As a result
of optimizing behavior by the private sector, in any equilibrium, the endogenous
variables (x0;x1(¢)) must satisfy a system of functional equations
F(y0;y1(¢);¹) = 0; (1.1)
3The conception of policy robustness here is similar to the one explored in detail in Hansen
and Sargent (2005c), though they do not consider the particular source of uncertainty about policy
outcomes treated here.
2where yt is the vector obtained by stacking xt and ut, and ¹ is the element of M (the
set of measures over possible values of (s;y1)) that indicates private-sector expecta-
tions in the initial period.
The policymaker wishes to choose a policy (u0;u1(¢)) so as to minimize an expected
loss function
E[L(y0;y1;s)]; (1.2)
where the expectation E[¢] is with respect to the measure ¹ ¹ 2 M indicating the
policymaker's expectations in the initial period.4 In the case of any measure ¼ over
the possible states of the world s and any measurable function g(¢); let º¼;g denote the
element of M with marginal distribution ¼ and such that zero probability is assigned
to any outcomes in which y1 6= g(s): Then the policymaker evaluates the objective
(1.2) in the case of an equilibrium (y0;y1(¢)) using the measure
¹ ¹ = º¹ ¼;y1; (1.3)
where ¹ ¼ indicates the policymaker's beliefs about the probability of di®erent possible
states of nature s. (In the beliefs of the policymaker, ¹ ¼ is given independently of the
policy chosen, while y1(¢) and hence ¹ ¹ will depend on policy.)
In rational-expectations (RE) policy analysis, the analyst assumes that in any
equilibrium, the expectations of the private sector will also correspond to the mea-
sure ¹ ¹ = º¹ ¼;y1: Hence the analyst associates to any policy (u0;u1(¢)) an equilibrium
(y0;y1(¢)) that satis¯es
F(y0;y1(¢);º¹ ¼;y1) = 0;
and then evaluates (1.2) using the implied measure (1.3).
I shall suppose instead that the analyst recognizes that private agents may not
have rational expectations, i.e., that beliefs ¹ 6= ¹ ¹ are possible. But I shall suppose
that he nonetheless assumes that ¹ is not too di®erent from ¹ ¹: One reasonable kind
of conformity to demand is to assume that private beliefs be absolutely continuous
with respect to the analyst's beliefs, which means that private agents will agree with
4The policymaker is here assumed not to entertain doubts about the correctness of her own
expectations; thus I am here not concerned with the main kind of uncertainty emphasized by Hansen
and Sargent (2005c).
3the analyst about which outcomes have zero probability.5 This requires that private-
sector beliefs should be of the form
¹ = º¼;y1 (1.4)
for some measure ¼; even if ¼ is not necessarily the same as ¹ ¼: (In e®ect, agents are
assumed to correctly understand the equilibrium mapping from states of the world
to outcomes, even if they do not also correctly assign probabilities to states of the
world, as would be required for an RE equilibrium.)
The assumption of absolute continuity also requires that ¼ be absolutely contin-
uous with respect to ¹ ¼: A consequence of this is that there must exist a measurable
function m(¢), with the property that E[m] = 1; such that for any measurable func-
tion g(¢) (specifying a random variable at date 1), the expectation ^ E[g] of this random
variable under the distorted probability beliefs of the private sector is equal to6
^ E[g] = E[mg]:
This representation of the distorted beliefs of the private sector is useful in de¯ning
a measure of the distance of the private-sector beliefs ¼ from those of the policy
analyst, ¹ ¼: As discussed in Hansen and Sargent (2005a, b, c), the relative entropy
R(¼; ¹ ¼) ´ E[m logm]
is a distance measure with a number of appealing properties.7 In particular, distorted
beliefs ¼ that are not too di®erent from ¹ ¼ in the sense that R(¼; ¹ ¼) is small are ones
5In the dynamic problem treated in the application to monetary stabilization policy below, I
actually assume only that private beliefs be absolutely continuous over ¯nite time intervals, as in
Hansen et al. (2005). This means that I allow for misspeci¯cations that should be detected in the
case of a data sample of in¯nite length, as long as they are not easy to detect using a ¯nite data set.
As Hansen et al. discuss, this is necessary if one wants the policy analyst to be concerned about
possible misspeci¯cations that continue to matter far in the future. Absolute continuity over ¯nite
time intervals su±ces for the representation of distorted beliefs proposed in this section to continue
to apply in the dynamic setting.
6The existence of the function m(¢) is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem. In the case
of a discrete set of states s; m(s) is simply the ratio ¼(s)=¹ ¼(s): This way of describing distorted
beliefs is used, for example, by Hansen and Sargent (2005a, b) and Hansen et al. (2005).
7For example, R(¼; ¹ ¼) is a positive-valued, convex function of ¼, uniquely minimized (with the
value zero) when mt+1 = 1 almost surely (the case of RE).
4that (according to the beliefs of the analyst) private agents would not be expected to
be able to discon¯rm by observing the outcome of repeated plays of the game, except
in the case of a very large number of repetitions (the number expected to be required
being larger the smaller the relative entropy). One might thus view the distorted
beliefs ¼ as more plausible the smaller is R(¼; ¹ ¼):
One way to incorporate a concern on the part of the policy analyst for robustness
with regard to this type of uncertainty is to suppose that the analyst wishes to choose
a policy (x0;x1(¢)) that is not too bad (does not imply too high a value of (1.2) under
any equilibrium (solution to (1.1) associated with private-sector beliefs of the form
(1.4) for which the relative entropy is not too large. Thus we might assume that the
policy is chosen to minimize
¹ L(x0;x(¢)) = maxE[L(y0;y1;s)]; (1.5)
where the maximization in (1.5) is over triples (y0;y1(¢);¼) such that (1.1) is satis¯ed
when ¹ is given by (1.4), and such that
R(¼; ¹ ¼) · ¹ R; (1.6)
for some ¯nite bound ¹ R > 0: In this case, the concern for robustness would be
modeled in a way analogous to the formalization of ambiguity aversion by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989).
Alternatively, we can model a concern for robustness in a way analogous to the
one that is primarily used by Hansen and Sargent (2005c), who follow the lead of
the engineering literature on robust control. Instead of supposing that the \worst-
case" near-rational expectations (NRE) contemplated by the analyst are those that
maximize (1.2) over a set of possible beliefs de¯ned by the constraint (1.6), we may
suppose that the worst-case beliefs (and associated equilibrium outcomes) associated
with a given policy are the triple (^ y0; ^ y1(¢); ^ ¼) that maximize
E[L(y0;y1;s)] ¡ µR(¼; ¹ ¼); (1.7)
for some penalty coe±cient µ > 0; over all possible triples (y0;y1(¢);¼) such that (1.1)
is satis¯ed when ¹ is given by (1.4). Here no constraint such as (1.6) is imposed on
the distorted beliefs that may be considered, but beliefs that are less plausible (from
the point of view of the analyst) are more heavily penalized in the objective (1.7).
5Thus the analyst will only worry about possible distorted private-sector beliefs that
ought to be easy to discon¯rm in the case that this particular kind of di®erence in
beliefs would be especially problematic for the particular policy under consideration.8
This is the de¯nition of worst-case NRE that I shall use here. The policy analyst
is assumed to choose a policy (x0;x1(¢) that minimizes ^ L(x0;x(¢)); the maximized
value of(1.7) under beliefs (1.3), obtained when (y0;y1(¢)) are the worst-case NRE
beliefs consistent with the policy (x0;x1(¢)).9 One can think of this as the Stackelberg
equilibrium of a game between the policymaker and a \malevolent agent" who chooses
the private-sector beliefs ¼ that will most embarrass the policymaker.10 Robust policy
in this sense approaches the optimal policy commitment under RE in the limit as µ
is made unboundedly large, so that the beliefs of the private sector are assumed to
be given by ¼ = ¹ ¼ regardless of the policy chosen.
The robust policy problem considered here is related to, though not quite the same
as, the type of problem considered by Hansen and Sargent (2005c, chap. 16). Hansen
and Sargent discuss a class of \Stackelberg problems" in which a \leader" chooses
8Maccheroni et al. (2004, 2005) show that choosing so as to minimize an objective of the form
(1.7) is consistent with a set of axioms for choice under ambiguity aversion only slightly weaker than
those of Gilboa and Schmeidler. Both the objective (1.7) and this one are only two members of a
broader family that they characterize; the Hansen-Sargent \multiplier preferences" are convenient
for my purposes.
9Alternatively, one might suppose that the policy analyst is assumed to choose a policy (x0;x1(¢)
that minimizes Ly(x0;x(¢)); the value of (1.2) under the same worst-case NRE beliefs. The case
assumed in the text corresponds to \variational preferences" of the kind discussed by Maccheroni
et al. (2004, 2005), and also to the kind of \multiplier robust control problem" treated extensively
by Hansen and Sargent (2005c). Apart from the appeal of the axiomatic foundations o®ered by
Maccheroni et al. for their representation of preferences, this formulation has the advantage of
making the objectives of the policy analyst and the \malevolent agent" perfectly opposed, so that
the \policy game" between them is a zero-sum game. This can have advantages when characterizing
the solution, though I have not relied on this aspect of the game in the analysis below. The monetary
stabilization policy problem is analyzed under the alternative assumption in Woodford (2005), and
the same qualitative results are obtained.
10Under the assumption made here about the policymaker's objective, the game is zero-sum,
and so under certain regularity conditions (that apply in the application below, for example), the
Stackelberg equilibrium is also the Nash equilibrium; one could then analyze a \multiplier game"
analogous to the one treated in Hansen and Sargent (2005c, chap. 6). Such a change in the timing
of moves by the two \players" is not innocuous, instead, under the alternative objective for the
policymaker mentioned in the previous footnote.
6a policy taking into account not only the optimizing response of the \follower" to
the policy, but also the fact that the follower optimizes under distorted beliefs (i.e.,
distorted from the point of view of the leader), as a result of the follower's concern
for possible model misspeci¯cation.11 The problem considered here is similar, except
that here the policy analyst is worried about the NRE beliefs that would be worst
for her own objectives, while in the Hansen-Sargent game, the leader anticipates that
the follower will act on the basis of the distorted beliefs that would imply the worst
outcome for the follower himself.12
One might think that this di®erence should not matter in practice, if the policy-
maker's objective coincides with that of the \follower" | as one might think should
be the case in an analysis of optimal policy from the standpoint of public welfare. But
in the application to stabilization policy below, the private sector is not really a single
agent, even though I assume that all price-setters share the same distorted beliefs. It
is not clear that allowing for a concern for robustness on the part of individual price-
setters would lead to their each optimizing in response to common distorted beliefs,
that coincide with those beliefs under which average expected utility is lowest.
But more crucially, even in a case where the private sector is made up of identical
agents who each solve precisely the same problem, the distorted beliefs that matter
in the Hansen-Sargent analysis are those that result in an equilibrium (y0;y1(¢)) with
the highest possible value of ^ E[L(y0;y1;s)]; i.e., the greatest subjective losses from the
point of view of the private sector. In the problem considered here, instead, the NRE
beliefs that matter are those that result in an equilibrium with the highest possible
value of E[L(y0;y1;s)]; even if the loss function is identical for the policymaker and
the private sector, I assume that it is the policymaker's evaluation of expected losses
that matters for robust policy analysis.
In the case that the objective of public policy is assumed to be private welfare, this
choice might not be considered obvious; there is always some ambiguity about what
11Hansen and Sargent also allow for a concern with potential misspeci¯cation on the part of the
leader, but in the limiting case of their setup in which £ = 1 while µ < 1; only the follower
contemplates that the common \approximating model" may be incorrect; the leader regards it as
correct, but takes account of the e®ect on the follower's behavior of the follower's concern that the
model may be incorrect.
12I also consider a di®erent class of possible distorted probability beliefs (Hansen and Sargent allow
only for shifts in the mean of the conditional distribution of possible values for the disturbances)
and use a di®erent measure of the degree of distortion of PS beliefs (relative entropy).
7it should mean for policy to be welfare-maximizing in the case that private agents
are regarded by the policy analyst as being mistaken about their situation. Here I
take the view that the policy analyst (that in this paper, at least, has no doubts
about the correct beliefs) should evaluate private welfare from the point of view of
what she believes to be the true likelihood of alternative outcomes. One might also
consider the alternative assumption, and de¯ne robustly optimal policy as the policy
that minimizes ^ E[L(y0;y1;s)]: In the application considered next, this alternative
assumption would lead to a much more trivial problem: the robustly optimal policy
commitment would be exactly like an optimal policy commitment under RE, if the
worst-case NRE beliefs were treated as true.13 Here I consider instead the harder
problem of how to choose a robustly optimal policy from the point of view of the
policy analyst's own probability beliefs.
2 An Application to Monetary Stabilization
Policy
The example considered here weakens the assumption regarding private-sector ex-
pectations in the well-known analysis by Clarida et al. (1999) of optimal monetary
policy in response to \cost-push shocks." It is assumed that the central bank can
bring about any desired state-contingent evolution of in°ation ¼t and of the output
gap xt consistent with the aggregate-supply relation
¼t = ·xt + ¯ ^ Et¼t+1 + ut; (2.1)
where · > 0;0 < ¯ < 1; ^ Et[¢] denotes the common (distorted) expectations of the
private sector (more speci¯cally, of price-setters | I shall call these PS expectations)
conditional on the state of the world in period t, and ut is an exogenous cost-push
13This would mean, for example, that the optimal policy commitment could be implemented
through commitment to perfectly stabilize a certain linear combination of the log price level and
the output gap, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 7). The quantitative form of the optimal
target criterion would be completely una®ected by the central bank's degree of concern for possible
forecast error on the part of the private sector. The possibility of NRE beliefs would only have
to be taken into account when implementing policy; for example, when evaluating the short-run
tradeo® between in°ation and the output gap, in order to produce an outcome that satis¯es the
target criterion.
8shock. The analysis is here simpli¯ed by assuming that all PS agents have com-
mon expectations (though these may not be model-consistent); given this, the usual
derivation14 of (2.1) as a log-linear approximation to an equilibrium relation implied
by optimizing price-setting behavior follows just as under the assumption of RE.
The central bank's (CB) policy objective is minimization of a discounted loss
function
E0
X
t=0
¯
t1
2
[¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] (2.2)
where ¸ > 0; x¤ ¸ 0; and the discount factor ¯ is the same as in (2.1). Here Et[¢]
denotes the conditional expectation of a variable under the CB beliefs, which I shall
treat as the \true" probabilities, since the analysis is conducted from the point of
view of the CB, which wishes to consider the e®ects of alternative possible policies.
I do not allow for any uncertainty on the part of the CB about the probability with
which various \objective" states of the world (histories of exogenous disturbances)
occur, in order to focus on the issue of uncertainty about PS expectations. The CB
believes that the exogenous states st evolve according to a law of motion
st+1 = Ast + Bwt+1 (2.3)
for some matrices A;B; where the random vector wt+1 is i.i.d. with distribution
N(0;I); the cost-push shock each period is then given by ut = v0st: Thus the vector
st describes all information available at time t about current or future \fundamentals".
Note that the law of motion (2.3) is not assumed to be correctly understood by the
PS.
I shall suppose that the central bank chooses (once and for all, at some initial
date) a state-contingent policy ¼t = ¼(ht); where ht ´ (wt;wt¡1;:::) is the history
of realizations of the exogenous disturbances. I assume that commitment of this
kind is possible, to the extent that it proves to be desirable; and we shall see that
it is desirable to commit in advance to a policy di®erent from the one that would
be chosen ex post, once any e®ects of one's decision on prior in°ation expectations
could be neglected. I also assume that there is no problem for the central bank
in implementing the state-contingent in°ation rate that it has chosen, once a given
situation ht is reached.15 This is likely to require that someone in the central bank
14See, e.g., Woodford (2003, chap. 3).
15Even so, the assumption that the central bank commits itself to a state-contingent path for
9can observe exactly what PS in°ation expectations are at the time of implementation
of the policy (in order to determine the nominal interest rate required to bring about
a certain rate of in°ation); I assume uncertainty about PS expectations only at the
time of selection of the state-contingent policy commitment. Note that any such
strategy ¼(¢) implies a uniquely de¯ned state-contingent evolution of both in°ation
and the output gap (given PS beliefs), using equation (2.1), and thus a well-de¯ned
value for CB expected losses (2.2).
As in section 1, I shall assume that NRE require that PS beliefs about the econ-
omy's evolution over any ¯nite horizon (and in particular, PS beliefs about the prob-
ability of various states in the following period) be absolutely continuous with respect
to those of the CB. Hence there exists a process fmt+1g with
mt+1 ¸ 0 a.s.; Et[mt+1] = 1;
such that
^ Et[Xt+1] = Et[mt+1Xt+1]
for any random variable Xt+1. The degree of distortion of PS beliefs can furthermore
be measured by the (discounted) relative entropy
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
tmt+1 logmt+1;
as in Hansen and Sargent (2005a). The presence of the discount factor ¯
t in this
expression means that the CB's concern with potential PS misunderstanding doesn't
vanish asymptotically; this makes possible a time-invariant characterization of ro-
bustly optimal policy in which the concern for robustness has nontrivial consequences.16
Consequently, in the case of any policy commitment f¼tg contemplated by the
CB, the \worst-case" NRE beliefs considered by the CB are given by the process
fmt+1g that maximizes
E0
X
t=0
¯
t1
2
[¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] ¡ µE0
1 X
t=0
¯
tmt+1 logmt+1 (2.4)
in°ation, rather than to a Taylor rule or to the satisfaction of some other form of target criterion,
is not innocuous. Using this representation of the policy commitment would be innocuous in a
RE analysis like that of Clarida et al. (1999), since one is e®ectively choosing from among all
possible REE. But here di®erent representations of policy do not lead to the same set of equilibrium
allocations being consistent with near-rational expectations.
16See Hansen et al. (2005) for discussion of this issue, in the context of a continuous-time analysis.
10subject to the constraint that Etmt+1 = 1 at all times, where at each date xt is
implied by the equation
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et[mt+1¼t+1] + ut: (2.5)
Here µ > 0 is a multiplier that indexes the degree of concern for robustness of policy
with respect to non-RE beliefs.
This problem for the \malevolent agent" is in turn equivalent to a sequence of
problems in which for each possible history ht, a function specifying mt+1 as a function
of the realization of wt+1 is chosen so as to maximize
1
2
[¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] ¡ µEt[mt+1 logmt+1] (2.6)
subject to the constraint that Etmt+1 = 1; where again xt is implied by (2.5). Worst-
case NRE then determine the expected output e®ect of any given state-dependent
in°ation commitment, according to a time-invariant relation of the form
xt = x
pess(ut;¼t;¼t+1(¢)); (2.7)
where ¼t+1(¢) speci¯es ¼t+1 as a measurable function of wt+1: The degree of distortion
of PS beliefs under the worst-case NRE is similarly indicated by a time-invariant
function
Et[mt+1 logmt+1] = R
pess(ut;¼t;¼t+1(¢)) (2.8)
indicating the relative entropy of the worst-case PS beliefs. A robustly optimal policy
commitment by the CB is then one that minimizes the maximized value of (2.4), which
is to say, that minimizes the objective function obtained by substituting (2.7) for the
output gap and (2.8) for the relative-entropy term in (2.4).
This problem can be given a recursive structure if we add an additional constraint,
assuming that the initial in°ation commitment ¼0(w0) is exogenously given.17 Let
J(¼0;s0) be the min-max value of (2.4), conditional on a particular initial state. Then
under robustly optimal policy, each period the function ¼t+1(¢) is chosen, given the
prior in°ation commitment ¼t and the state st, so as to minimize
1
2
¼
2
t +
¸
2
(x
pess(ut;¼t;¼t+1(¢)) ¡ x
¤)
2 ¡ µR
pess(ut;¼t;¼t+1(¢))
+ ¯E[J(¼t+1(w);Ast + Bw)]; (2.9)
17The same kind of initial commitment de¯nes an optimal policy \from a timeless perspective" in
the RE analysis presented in Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
11where the expectation is over possible realizations of w. The minimized value of (2.9)
is then precisely the value function J(¼t;st): This constrained version of the robust
policy problem is of interest because (as a result of its recursive form) it results in a
time-invariant rule for robustly optimal policy.
This recursive structure implies that there is no need for the CB to commit itself
more than a period in advance. However, it is important that the state-contingent
in°ation commitments be chosen at least a period in advance, rather than waiting
until the state st+1 is known and then choosing ¼t+1 to minimize J(¼t+1;st+1): The
latter (purely discretionary) approach to policy will not achieve as low a value of
(2.9), and hence not as low a value of (2.4) under the worst-case NRE beliefs, as will
the approach of choosing a state-contingent in°ation commitment each period for the
following period. The reason for this advantage of policy commitment is exactly the
same, of course, as in the RE analysis of optimal policy in this model (treated in
Clarida et al., 1999, and Woodford, 2003, chap. 7).
3 Robustly Optimal Linear Policy
Rather than seeking to characterize fully optimal policy in the sense de¯ned above, I
shall here characterize the optimal policy within a more restrictive class of linear poli-
cies. By a linear policy I mean one in which each period's state-contingent in°ation
commitment is of the form
¼t+1(wt+1) = p
0
t + p
10
t wt+1; (3.1)
where p0
t is some function of ht and p1
t depends only on t.18 The optimal policy
commitment under RE is linear in this sense; hence a consideration of this special
family of policies su±ces to indicate a direction in which it is desirable to change the
CB's policy commitment as a result of concern for robustness.
We begin by characterizing the worst-case NRE in the case of an arbitrary linear
policy. One notes that an interior solution to the problem of maximizing (2.6) exists
18It will turn out that in the case of the optimal linear policy, p0
t is also a linear function of ht;
but one does not need to impose that.
12only if19
jp
1
tj
2 <
µ
¯
2
·2
¸
: (3.2)
Otherwise, the objective (2.6) is convex, and the worst-case expectations involve
extreme distortion, resulting in unbounded losses for the CB. Obviously, it is optimal
for the CB to choose a linear policy such that p1
t satis¯es the bound (3.2) at all
times. This provides an immediate contrast with optimal policy under RE, where the
optimal vector p1 (which is constant over time) is proportional to ¾u; the standard
deviation of the cost-push shocks.20 At least for large values of ¾u; it is evident that
concern for robustness leads to less sensitivity of in°ation to cost-push disturbances
(smaller jp1
tj). One also observes that it leads to a failure of certainty equivalence, as
this would require jp1
tj to grow in proportion to ¾u:
In the case of a linear policy satisfying (3.2), under the worst-case NRE, the
CB fears that the PS will expect wt+1 to be conditionally distributed as N(¹t;I): If
p1
t = 0; ¹t = 0; while if p1
t 6= 0;
¹t = (¹ ¼t ¡ p
0
t)
p1
t
jp1
tj2; (3.3)
where the worst-case in°ation expectation (value of ^ Et¼t+1) is given by
¹ ¼t = ¢
¡1
t
·
p
0
t ¡ (¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤)
¯¸
µ·2jp
1
tj
2
¸
; (3.4)
¢t ´ 1 ¡
¯
2
µ
¸
·2jp
1
tj
2 > 0: (3.5)
The worst-case NRE beliefs distort PS in°ation expectations with respect to p0
t (the
CB's expectation) in the direction opposite to that needed to bring xt closer to x¤;
and this distortion is greater the larger is the sensitivity of (next period's) in°ation
to unexpected shocks, becoming unboundedly large as the bound (3.2) is approached.
As a consequence of this possibility, the CB fears an output gap equal to
x
pess
t ¡ x
¤ =
(¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤) ¡ ¯p0
t
·¢t
: (3.6)
19See the Appendix, section A.1, for derivation of this condition, as well as the results stated in
the following two paragraphs. Strictly speaking, it is possible for the inequality (3.2) to be only
weakly satis¯ed, if p0
t satis¯es a certain linear relation stated in the Appendix; the Appendix treats
this case as well, omitted here for simplicity. It is shown in section A.2 that in the robustly optimal
linear policy, the inequality is strict.
20See, e.g., equation (3.12) below.
13Note that xt¡x¤ is larger than it would be under RE by a factor ¢
¡1
t , which exceeds
1 except in the limit in which µ is unboundedly large (the RE limit), or if p1
t = 0, so
that in°ation is perfectly predictable.
The probabilities assigned by the PS to di®erent possible realizations of wt+1 are
distorted by a factor mt+1 such that
logmt+1 = ct ¡
¯
µ
¸
·
(xt ¡ x
¤)¼t+1;
where the constant ct takes the value necessary in order for Etmt+1 to equal 1. This
implies that the degree of distortion of the worst-case NRE beliefs (as measured by
relative entropy) is equal to
R
pess
t ´ ^ Et[logmt+1] =
1
2
·
¯
µ
¸
·
(xt ¡ x
¤)
¸2
jp
1
tj
2 ¸ 0: (3.7)
Note that the degree of distortion against which the policy analyst must guard is
greater the larger the degree of ine±ciency of the output gap (i.e., the larger is
jxt ¡ x¤j), as this increases the marginal cost to the CB's objectives of (maliciously
chosen) forecast errors of a given size; and greater the larger the degree to which
in°ation is sensitive to disturbances (i.e., the larger is jp1
tj), as this increases the
scope for misunderstanding of the probability distribution of possible future rates of
in°ation, for a given degree of discrepancy between CB and PS beliefs (as measured by
relative entropy). Of course, it is also greater the smaller is µ; the penalty parameter
that we use to index the CB's degree of concern for robustness to PS expectational
error.
Substituting (3.6) for the output gap and (3.7) for the relative entropy term in
(2.4), we obtain a loss function for the CB of the form
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
tL(¼t;pt;st); (3.8)
where pt ´ (p0
t;p1
t) and
¼t = p
0
t¡1 + p
10
t¡1wt: (3.9)
Expression (3.8) indicates the CB's expected losses from a given linear policy fptg,
under the worst-case NRE beliefs. We wish to minimize this subject to an initial
constraint ¼0: Moreover, because we do not wish to allow p1
t to vary in response to
14random shocks, we actually minimize the unconditional expectation of (3.8), integrat-
ing over alternative possible initial conditions (p0
¡1;s¡1) and over alternative possible
realizations of w0.
A robustly optimal linear policy (from a timeless perspective) is then a pair of
sequences fp0
t;p1
tg that minimize the expected value of (3.8) subject to the law of
motion (3.9), given an initial commitment p1
¡1 = ¹ p1 and integrating over initial con-
ditions (p0
¡1;s¡1) using a measure ½: The value of p0
t is allowed to depend on the
history ht, as well as the particular initial conditions that are drawn from the sup-
port of ½; but a value for p1
t must be chosen that is independent of shock realizations
and the same for all initial conditions (which is why the measure ½ matters). The
initial constraints (¹ p1;½) are chosen to be self-consistent,21 which means that under
the optimal policy, p1
t = ¹ p1 for all t ¸ 0; and ½ is an invariant measure for (p0
t;st).
One can show that values of (¹ p1;½) exist with this property.
Given p1
t = ¹ p1, the loss function L(¼t;pt;st) is a quadratic function of (¼t;p0
t;st);
and the laws of motion (2.3) and (3.9) are linear in these variables. Hence one has a
linear-quadratic optimal control problem, and the optimal solution is a linear policy
of the form
p
0
t = ¹p
0
t¡1 + a
0st + ¹¹ p
10wt; (3.10)
just like the unconstrained optimal policy under RE. A concern for robustness a®ects
the numerical magnitudes of ¹;a; and ¹ p1: But one thing that is not a®ected is the
fact that (3.10) implies stationary °uctuations in the in°ation rate around a long-run
in°ation target of zero. Thus the optimal long-run target is una®ected by the degree
of concern for robustness; in particular, allowance for NRE does not result in an
in°ation bias of the kind associated with discretionary policy.22
Here I illustrate the quantitative e®ects of a concern for robustness in an example
in which the cost-push shock is purely transitory, so that wt is a scalar and ut = ¾uwt:
Under RE,
0 < ¹ < 1; a
0st = ¡¹¾uwt; (3.11)
and
¹ p
1 = ¹¾u: (3.12)
21See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for the concept of self-consistency invoked here.
22On the in°ation bias associated with discretionary policy, see Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford
(2003, chap. 7).
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Figure 1: Variation of ¹ p1 with ¾u; under alternative degrees of concern for robustness.
With a concern for robustness (¯nite µ), conditions (3.11) both still hold, but ¹ is
now the smaller root of the quadratic equation
P(¹) ´ ¯¹
2 ¡
µ
1 + ¯ +
·2 ¹ ¢
¸
¶
¹ + 1 = 0; (3.13)
where 0 < ¹ ¢ · 1 is the constant value of (3.5) associated with ¹ p1: It is evident from
(3.13) that ¹ is larger the smaller is ¹ ¢; and since a concern for robustness lowers ¹ ¢,
it raises ¹ relative to the RE case. Moreover, contrary to (3.12), one can show that
¹ p1 < ¹¾u (3.14)
when µ is ¯nite.
Figure 1 shows how ¹ p1 varies with ¾u for alternative values of µ.23 In the RE case,
¹ p1 increases linearly with ¾u, as indicated by (3.12) and as required for certainty-
23In this ¯gure, I assume parameter values ¯ = 0:99;· = 0:05;¸ = 0:08; and x¤ = 0:2: A low value
of ¸ is justi¯ed by the welfare-theoretic foundations of the loss function (2.2) discussed in Woodford
(2003, chap. 6).
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Figure 2: Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock, with and without concern
for robustness.
equivalence. For any given amplitude of cost-push shocks, lower µ (greater concern
for robustness) results in a lower optimal ¹ p1; indicating less sensitivity of in°ation to
the current cost-push shock. The extent to which this is true increases in the case of
larger shocks; in the case of any ¯nite value of µ; ¹ p1 increases less than proportionally
with ¾u; indicating a failure of certainty equivalence. In fact, ¹ p1 remains bounded
above, as required by (3.2).
Thus a concern for robustness results in less willingness to let in°ation increase in
response to a positive cost-push shock. This is because larger surprise variations in
in°ation increase the extent to which PS agents may over-forecast in°ation, worsening
the output/in°ation tradeo® facing the CB. This conclusion recalls the one reached
by Orphanides and Williams (2005a) on the basis of a model of learning.
At the same time, a concern for robustness increases the degree to which optimal
policy is history-dependent. As in the RE case, an optimal commitment involves
17a lower in°ation rate (on average) in periods subsequent to a positive cost-push
shock. Moreover, because ¹ is closer to 1 when µ is smaller, this e®ect on average
in°ation should last longer, so that the history-dependence of the optimal in°ation
commitment is even greater than under RE. And not only should the CB commit to
eventually undo any price increases resulting from positive cost-push shocks (as in the
RE case); when µ is ¯nite, it should commit to eventually reduce the price level below
the level it would have had in the absence of the shock. This is illustrated in Figure 2
in the case of the numerical example just discussed.24 The lower right panel shows the
impulse response of the log price level; while under rational expectations, the optimal
commitment returns the price level eventually to precisely the level that it would have
had in the absence of the shock, when µ = 0:001; the optimal commitment eventually
reduces the price level, by an amount about twice as large as the initial price-level
increase in response to the shock. The result that the sign of the initial price-level
e®ect is eventually reversed is quite general. Equations (3.9) { (3.11) imply that
the cumulative log price increase due to a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock is
equal to
(¹ p
1 ¡ ¹¾u)=(1 ¡ ¹); (3.15)
which is zero when (3.12) holds, but negative when µ is ¯nite.
Allowance for NRE means that the CB cannot count on its intention to lower in-
°ation (on average) following a positive cost-push shock to lower PS expectations of
in°ation by as much as the CB's own forecast of future in°ation is reduced. (For ex-
ample, Figure 3 compares the impulse response of PS expected in°ation ^ Et¼t+1 to the
response of CB expected in°ation Et¼t+1, in the same numerical example as in Figure
2.) But the consequence of this for robustly optimal policy is not that the CB should
not bother to try to in°uence in°ation expectations through a history-dependent
policy; instead, it is optimal to commit to adjust the subsequent in°ation target to
an even greater extent and in a more persistent, in order to ensure that in°ation
expectations are a®ected even if expectations are not perfectly model-consistent.
24In the ¯gure, optimal impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation positive cost-push shock
are shown, both in the case of in¯nite µ (the standard RE analysis) and for a value µ = 0:001: Other
parameter values are as in Figure 1; in addition, it is assumed here that ¾u = 0:02:
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Figure 3: Distortion of PS beliefs, in the worst-case NRE contemplated by the CB
when µ = 0:001:
4 Near-Rational Expectations and the Importance
of Policy Commitment
I have observed above that robustly optimal policy involves advance commitment,
in a similar way as optimal policy under the assumption of rational expectations.
But does the degree to which PS expectations may depart from model-consistency
a®ect the degree to which commitment matters? In order to address this question,
it is necessary to characterize equilibrium policy under discretionary optimization on
the part of a CB that understands that private-sector expectations need not be fully
model-consistent, and compare this to the robustly optimal policy under commitment.
Suppose that the objective of the central bank is to minimize (2.4),25 as above,
but that each period the central bank chooses a short-run in°ation target ¼t after
25In appendix A.3, I discuss the way in which my results are modi¯ed if one assumes instead that
the CB seeks to minimize (2.2), while the malevolent agent seeks to maximize (2.4).
19learning the current state st; without making any commitment as to the in°ation
rate that it may choose at any later dates. Because the payo®s and constraints of
both the CB and the malevolent agent in the continuation game at date t depend on
the past only through the state vector st, in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE),
¼t will depend only on st: I shall assume an equilibrium of this kind;26 hence there
is assumed to exist a time-invariant policy function ¹ ¼(¢) such that in equilibrium
¼t = ¹ ¼(st) each period. Under discretionary optimization, the CB takes for granted
the fact that it will choose to follow the rule ¹ ¼(¢) in all subsequent periods, though
it is not committed to follow it in the current period. The CB also takes for granted
the set of possible NRE beliefs of the PS regarding the economy's future evolution,
given that (at least in the view of the CB) the truth is that the exogenous states will
evolve according to (2.3), monetary policy will follow the rule ¹ ¼(¢); and output will be
determined by (2.1). It then chooses an in°ation rate ¼t to implement in the current
period, given its own model of the economy's subsequent evolution and guarding
against the worst-case NRE beliefs given that model. In a MPE, the solution to this
problem is precisely the in°ation rate ¼t = ¹ ¼(st):
I shall formally de¯ne a robust MPE as follows. Given a policy rule ¹ ¼(¢); let
V (¼0;s0) be the value of the objective (2.4) if the initial state is s0, the CB chooses
an in°ation rate ¼0 in that initial state and then follows the rule ¹ ¼(¢) in all periods
t ¸ 1; and PS beliefs correspond to the worst-case NRE beliefs given this policy. Then
given the in°ation rate chosen in any period, the worst-case NRE beliefs mt+1(¢) solve
the problem
max
mt+1(¢)
1
2
[¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] ¡ µEt¯
tmt+1 logmt+1 + ¯EtV (¹ ¼(st+1;st+1); (4.1)
where xt satis¯es
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et[mt+1¹ ¼(st+1)] + ut:
A robust MPE is then a pair of functions ¹ ¼(¢) and V (¢;¢) such that for any pair
(¼t;st), V (¼t;st) is the maximized value of (4.1), and for any state st; ¹ ¼(st) is the
in°ation rate that solves the problem
min
¼t
V (¼t;st): (4.2)
26The restriction to Markov perfect equilibria is commonplace in the literature on discretionary
monetary policy under rational expectations; the equilibrium concept proposed here generalizes the
one used by Clarida et al. (1999) in their RE analysis of this model.
20A robust linear MPE is a robust MPE in which ¹ ¼(¢) is a linear function of the state,
¹ ¼(st) = ¼
¤ + d
0st; (4.3)
for some long-run average in°ation rate ¼¤ and some vector of coe±cients d:
A linear policy (4.3) is an example of the kind of linear policy considered in the
previous section, where in terms of the previous notation (3.1) we now have
p
0
t = ¼
¤ + d
0Ast; p
10 = d
0B: (4.4)
Moreover, because the ¯nal term in (4.1) is independent of the choice of mt+1(¢); the
function mt+1(¢) that solves the problem (4.1) is also the one that maximizes (2.6),
so that the characterization of worst-case NRE beliefs in appendix A.1 again applies.
Once again, jp1j must satisfy the bound (3.2) in order for there to be well-de¯ned
worst-case beliefs;27 and when this bound is satis¯ed, the worst-case beliefs are again
described by (3.3) { (3.4).
Given this characterization of worst-case beliefs, the problem (4.2) of the discre-
tionary central bank reduces to
min
¼t
L(¼t; ¹ p(st);st); (4.5)
where L(¼t;pt;st) is the loss function de¯ned in appendix A.2, and ¹ p(st) is the function
de¯ned in (4.4). Since for any st; L is a strictly convex, quadratic function of ¼t; the
discretionary policy ¹ ¼(st) is just the solution to the ¯rst-order condition
L¼(¼t; ¹ p(st);st) = 0:
This linear equation in ¼t is easily solved, yielding
¹ ¼(st) =
¸
·2 ¹ ¢ + ¸
[·x
¤ + ut + ¯¹ p
0(st)]: (4.6)
This in turn implies that ¹ ¼(¢) is indeed a linear function of the form (4.3), where
¼
¤ =
¸·x¤
·2 ¹ ¢ + (1 ¡ ¯)¸
> 0; (4.7)
27In the case of discretionary policy, I can no longer argue that the CB will surely choose a policy
that satis¯es (3.2), in order to avoid unbounded losses. For now the CB is assumed to choose ¼t+1
without taking into account the e®ect of the way in which the dependence of ¼t+1 on wt+1 a®ects
the worst-case choice of mt+1(¢), given that the distorted PS beliefs are a historical fact by the time
that ¼t+1 is chosen. Nonetheless, there can be no well-de¯ned equilibrium in which (3.2) is violated.
21d
0 = ¸[·
2 ¹ ¢I + ¸(I ¡ ¯A)]
¡1v
0: (4.8)
In both of these expressions, 0 < ¹ ¢ · 1 is the constant value of (3.5) implied by the
constant vector p1 de¯ned in (4.4).
A robust linear MPE exists if we can solve these equations. While equations (4.7)
{ (4.8) give unique solutions for ¼¤ and d (and hence for the linear function ¹ ¼(¢)) on
the assumption that we already know the value of p1 (and hence the value of ¹ ¢),
the value of p1 depends on the solution for d, as indicated in (4.4). There is in fact
a ¯xed-point problem to solve, and depending on parameter values, there may be a
unique ¯xed point, multiple ¯xed points, or none at all; in the latter case, no robust
linear MPE exists.
These possibilities can be illustrated by again considering the case of i.i.d. cost-
push shocks, as in section 3. In this case, the ¯xed-point problem reduces to ¯nding
values ¹ p1; ¹ ¢ that satisfy the two equations
¹ p
1 =
¸
·2 ¹ ¢ + ¸
¾u; (4.9)
¹ ¢ = 1 ¡
¯
2
µ
¸
·2j¹ p
1j
2; (4.10)
along with the bound (3.2), so that 0 < ¹ ¢ · 1: One can show that if ¸=·2 ¸ 2; there
is a unique robust linear MPE if ¾u < ^ p1; while no MPE exist if ¾u ¸ ^ p1; where ^ p1 is
the upper bound on j¹ p1j de¯ned in (3.2).28 If instead ¸=·2 < 2; then there is a unique
MPE if ¾u · ^ p1; but two distinct MPE if ^ p1 < ¾u < ¾¤
u; where
¾
¤
u ´
2
3
p
3
"
µ
¯
2
µ
·2 + ¸
¸
¶3#1=2
: (4.11)
There is again a unique MPE in the special case that ¾u = ¾¤
u; but there exist no
MPE if ¾u > ¾¤
u:29
The possibility of multiple solutions is illustrated numerically in Figure 4. Here
the parameter values assumed are as in Figure 1, except that now · = 0:15;30 and I
28See appendix A.4 for the proof of this result and the ones stated next, and equation (A.20) in
the appendix for the de¯nition of ^ p1.
29Regardless of the value of ¾u > 0; this bound will be violated in the case of small enough µ;
which is to say, in the case of a large enough concern for robustness on the part of the CB.
30A larger value of · is used in this example in order to illustrate the possibility of multiple
solutions, which do not exist under the baseline calibration.
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Figure 4: Varying numbers of linear MPE, depending on the size of the cost-push
disturbances.
graph the locus of solutions only for the case µ = 0:001: A unique solution exists for
values of ¾u smaller than 0.068,31 two solutions exist for values between 0.068 and
0.159, and no solutions exist for larger values of ¾u: In the intermediate range, the
second solution (in which in°ation is more sensitive to cost-push shocks) is shown by
the dotted branch of the locus of ¯xed points. While these solutions also satisfy the
above de¯nition of a robust linear MPE, they are less appealing than the ones on the
branch shown as a solid line in the ¯gure, on grounds of what Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) refer to as \expectational stability."
31As the graph suggests, there are actually two solutions to the system of equations in this region
as well { the dotted branch of the locus of solutions can be extended further to the left. But for
values of ¾u this small, the solutions on the dotted branch involve ¹ ¢ < 0; and so do not correspond
to MPE.
23One can reduce the system (4.9) { (4.10) to the single equation
¹ p
1 = ©(¹ p
1); (4.12)
where ©(~ p) is the value of ¹ p1 that satis¯es (4.9), when ¹ ¢ in this equation is the value
obtained by substituting ¹ p1 = ~ p in equation (4.10). Then ©(p1
t) indicates the degree
of sensitivity of in°ation to cost-push shocks that would optimally be chosen by a
CB choosing under discretion in period t, if it expects the sensitivity of in°ation to
cost-push shocks in the following period to be given by p1
t.32 One can show that
the lower branch of solutions corresponds to ¯xed points at which 0 < ©0(¹ p1) < 1;
while the upper branch corresponds to ¯xed points at which ©0(¹ p1) > 1: Hence in the
former case, an expectation that policy will be near the ¯xed point far in the future
will justify choosing a policy very close to the ¯xed point now, while in the latter case,
even an expectation that policy will be near that ¯xed point in the distant future
will not lead the CB to choose policy near that ¯xed point now | only if future
policy is expected to coincide precisely with the ¯xed point will similar behavior be
justi¯ed now. Hence this ¯xed point is \unstable" under perturbations of expectations
regarding future policy in a way that makes it less plausible that successive central
bankers should coordinate on those particular expectations.33
What happens in the case of an economy in the region where ¾u is too large for any
MPE to exist? (Note that this requires that ¾u > ^ p1:) One observes that ©(0) > 0;
and also that ©(^ p1) = ¾u > ©(^ p1): Then, if there are no ¯xed points in the interval
(0; ^ p1); ©(p) > p over the entire interval.34 This means that whatever value of p1 may
be expected to describe monetary policy in the following period, a CB that optimizes
under discretion will choose a larger value in the current period. There is then no
Markov perfect equilibrium; but the situation is clearly one in which (an attempt
32Thus ©(¢) is a mapping from the discretionary CB's \perceived law of motion" to the \actual
law of motion" resulting from its optimizing decisions, in the terminology of Evans and Honkaphja
(2001).
33One can also show that the expectationally stable MPE is an asymptotically stable rest point
under adaptive learning dynamics, in which a sequence of central bankers seek to forecast the policies
of their successors by extrapolating observed policy in the past, while the expectationally unstable
MPE will also be unstable under the learning dynamics. On the connection between expectational
stability and stability under adaptive learning dynamics, see generally Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
34If instead there are two ¯xed points, the sign of ©(p) ¡ p changes between them; this is what
makes the lower solution expectationally stable while the upper is unstable.
24at) discretionary optimization would be expected to lead to very large responses of
in°ation to cost-push shocks | there would be no reason for the in°ation response
to remain within any ¯nite bounds!
In the case of rational expectations (the limiting case in which µ
¡1 = 0), there is
always a unique solution, given by
¹ p
1 =
¸
·2 + ¸
¾u > 0: (4.13)
This is the characterization of policy under discretion given by Clarida et al. (1999);
the linearity in ¾u again indicates that a principle of certainty equivalence applies.
Comparison with (3.12) indicates that under discretionary policy, in°ation responds
more strongly to a cost-push shock than under the optimal commitment, according
to the RE analysis. Moreover, because ¼¤ > 0 in the case of discretion, while the
long-run average in°ation rate is zero under the optimal commitment, discretionary
policy is characterized by an \in°ationary bias". These discrepancies between what
policy would be like in the best possible RE equilibrium and what it is like in the
MPE with discretionary policy indicate the importance of advance commitment to
an optimal decision procedure for monetary policy.
How are these familiar results a®ected by allowing for near-rational expectations?
We see from (4.7) that whenever a robust linear MPE exists, it involves a positive
average in°ation rate ¼¤; so again discretionary policy results in an in°ationary bias.
Moreover, this equation indicates that ¼¤ is a decreasing function of ¹ ¢; hence the
in°ationary bias is increased by a concern for robustness on the part of the CB (which
makes ¹ ¢ less than 1). The problem of excessive sensitivity of the in°ation rate to
cost-push shocks is also increased by a concern for robustness. We observe from (4.9)
that
¹ p
1 >
¸
·2 + ¸
¾u (4.14)
when ¹ ¢ < 1; so that ¹ p1 is larger than in the RE case, described by (4.13). One
can also show35 that if we select the lower-sensitivity MPE as \the" prediction of
the model when multiple solutions exist, then the solution for ¹ p1 is monotonically
decreasing in µ over the range of values for which a robust linear MPE exists, which
means that ¹ p1 is higher the greater the concern for robustness.
35Again see appendix A.4 for the proof.
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Figure 5: Variation of ¹ p1 with ¾u; under discretionary policy and under an optimal
commitment, with and without allowance for near-rational expectations.
While a concern for robustness increases the sensitivity of in°ation to cost-push
shocks under discretionary policy, we found in section 3 that it reduces the sensitivity
to cost-push shocks under an optimal commitment. This is illustrated numerically
in Figure 5, which extends Figure 1 to show how the equilibrium value of ¹ p1 varies
with ¾u under discretionary policy as well as under the optimal commitment from a
timeless perspective, both with and without an allowance for near-rational expecta-
tions.36 (The two lower curves correspond to cases also shown in Figure 1.) When
RE are assumed, ¹ p1 is larger under discretionary policy, as just shown; but with a
concern for robustness (¯nite µ), the gap between the values of ¹ p1 under discretionary
policy and under a robustly optimal linear policy is even larger.
Thus the distortions of policy resulting from optimization under discretion are
increased when the CB allows for the possibility of near-rational expectations, and
36The parameter values used in the ¯gure are again those used in Figure 1. The RE curves assume
that µ
¡1 = 0; while the ones allowing for NRE beliefs assume that µ
¡1 = 1000:
26the lessons of the RE analysis become only more important. When the CB's concern
for robustness is su±ciently small (i.e., µ is large), a robust linear MPE exists, but the
degree to which it involves both an excessive average rate of in°ation and excessive
responsiveness of in°ation to cost-push shocks, relative to what would occur under
the robustly optimal linear policy, is even greater than is true in the RE analysis. In
the case of a su±ciently great concern for robustness, a robust linear MPE fails even
to exist; in this case, the dangers of discretionary policy are even more severe, and to
an extent much greater than would be suggested by the RE analysis.
5 Conclusion
I have shown how it is possible to analyze optimal policy for a central bank that
recognizes that private expectations may not be model-consistent, without commit-
ting oneself to a particular model of expectational error. The approach leads to a
one-parameter family robustly-optimal linear policies, indexed by a parameter µ that
measures the degree of concern for possible misunderstanding of equilibrium dynam-
ics.
Even when the central bank's uncertainty about private expectations is consid-
erable (the case of low µ), calculation of the e®ects of anticipations of the system-
atic component of policy is still quite an important factor in policy analysis. Op-
timal policy is still history-dependent even when rational expectations are not as-
sumed. Indeed, a concern for robustness only increases the optimal degree of history-
dependence.
Moreover, just as in the RE analysis, commitment is important for optimal policy.
The distortions predicted to result from discretionary policymaking become even more
severe when the central bank allows for the possibility of near-rational expectations,
so that the importance of commitment is increased. And, as in the RE analysis, a
crucial feature of an optimal commitment is a guarantee that in°ation will be low
and fairly stable. The fact that private beliefs may be distorted does not provide any
reason to aim for a higher average rate of in°ation, while it does provide a reason
for the central bank to resist even more ¯rmly the in°ationary consequences of \cost-
push" shocks.
27A Appendix: Details of Derivations
A.1 Worst-Case NRE Beliefs
The problem of the \malevolent agent" in any state of the world at date t (corre-
sponding to a history ht up to that point) is to choose a function specifying mt+1 as
a function of the realization of wt+1 so as to maximize
1
2
[¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] ¡ µEt[mt+1 logmt+1] (A.1)
subject to the constraint that Etmt+1 = 1; where at each date xt is implied by the
equation
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et[mt+1¼t+1] + ut: (A.2)
Here I characterize the solution to this problem in the case that the CB follows a
linear policy, so that in each possible state at date t + 1 (given the history ht), the
in°ation rate is given by ¼t+1 = p0
t + p10
t wt+1; where p0
t depends only on ht and p1
t
depends only on the date t.
It is obvious that the choice of the random variable mt+1 matters only through
its consequences for the relative entropy (which a®ects the objective (A.1)) on the
one hand, and its consequences for PS expected in°ation (which a®ects the constraint
(A.2) on the other. Hence in the case of any µ > 0; the worst-case beliefs will minimize
the relative entropy Et[mt+1 logmt+1] subject to the constraints that
Etmt+1 = 1; Et[mt+1¼t+1] = ¹ ¼t; (A.3)
whatever degree of distortion the PS in°ation expectation ¹ ¼t may represent. I ¯rst
consider this problem. Since r(m) ´ mlogm is a strictly convex function of m, such
that r0(m) ! ¡1 as m ! 0 and r0(m) ! +1 as m ! +1; it is evident that there
is a unique, interior optimum, such that the ¯rst-order condition
v
0(mt+1) = Á1t + Á2t¼t+1
holds in each state at date t + 1; where Á1t;Á2t are Lagrange multipliers associated
with the two constraints (A.3). This implies that
logmt+1 = ct + Á2t¼t+1 (A.4)
28in each state, for some constant ct: The two constants ct and Á2t in (A.4) are then
the values that satisfy the two constraints (A.3).
Under the assumption of a linear policy, ¼t+1 is conditionally normally distributed,
so that (A.4) implies that mt+1 is conditionally log-normal.37 It follows that
logEtmt+1 = Et[logmt+1] +
1
2
vart[logmt+1]
= ct + Á2tp
0
t +
1
2
Á
2
2tjp
1
tj
2:
Hence the ¯rst constraint (A.3) is satis¯ed if and only if
ct = ¡Á2tp
0
t ¡
1
2
Á
2
2tjp
1
tj
2: (A.5)
Under the worst-case beliefs, the PS perceives the conditional probability density
for wt+1 to be ~ f(wt+1) = mt+1(wt+1)f(wt+1); where f(¢) is the density for a vector
that is distributed as N(0;I): It follows from (A.4) and (A.5) that ~ f(¢) is the density
for a vector that is distributed as N(¹t;I); where the bias in the perceived conditional
expectation of wt+1 is ¹t = Á2tp1
t: Hence
^ Et¼t+1 = p
0
t + p
10
t ¹t = p
0
t + Á2tjp
1
tj
2;
and the second constraint (A.3) is satis¯ed if and only if38
Á2t =
¹ ¼t ¡ p0
t
jp1
tj2 : (A.6)
Condition (A.5) then uniquely determines ct as well, and mt+1 is completely described
by (A.4), once we have determined the value of ¹ ¼t that should be chosen by the
\malevolent agent." Note that the bias ¹t is given by expression (3.3), as asserted in
the text.
The relative entropy of the worst-case beliefs will then be equal to
R
pess
t = ^ Et[logmt+1] = ct + Á2t ^ Et¼t+1
=
1
2
(¹ ¼t ¡ p0
t)2
jp1
tj2 ; (A.7)
37This is one of the main reasons for the convenience of restricting our attention to linear policies.
38Here I assume that p1
t 6= 0: If p1
t = 0; the constraint is satis¯ed regardless of the distortion
chosen by the \malevolent agent," as long as ¹ ¼t = p0
t; which is necessarily the case. In this case, ct
and Á2t are not separately identi¯ed, but (A.5) su±ces to show that mt+1 = 1 with certainty.
29using (A.5) and (A.6). This is proportional to the squared distance between the PS
in°ation forecast and that of the central bank; but for any given size of gap between
the two, the size of the distortion of probabilities that is required is smaller the larger
is jp1
tj.39
It remains to determine the worst-case choice of ¹ ¼t:40 It follows from (A.2) that
(x
pess
t ¡ x
¤)
2 =
1
·2(¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯¹ ¼t)
2: (A.8)
Substituting this for the squared output gap and (A.7) for the relative entropy in
(A.1), we obtain an objective for the \malevolent agent" that is a quadratic function
Q(¹ ¼t;ut;¼t;pt) of the distorted in°ation forecast ¹ ¼t, and otherwise independent of
the distorted beliefs; thus ¹ ¼t is chosen to maximize this function. The function is
strictly concave (because the coe±cient multiplying ¹ ¼2
t is negative) if and only if
p1
t satis¯es inequality (3.2). If the inequality is reversed, the function Q is instead
convex, and is minimized rather than maximized at the value of ¹ ¼t that satis¯es the
¯rst-order condition Q¹ ¼ = 0: But in this case, the \malevolent agent" can achieve an
unboundedly large positive value of the objective (A.1), as stated in the text; and a
robustly optimal policy can never involve a value of p1
t this large.
In the case that (3.2) holds with equality, Q is linear in ¹ ¼t, and it is again possible
for the \malevolent agent" to achieve an unboundedly large positive value of the
objective through an extreme choice of ¹ ¼t; except in the special case that
p
0
t = ¯
¡1(¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤); (A.9)
so that the linear function has a slope of exactly zero. Thus unless p0
t satis¯es (A.9), p1
t
must satisfy the bound (3.2) in order for the objective (A.1) to have a ¯nite maximum.
Even in the special case that (A.9) holds exactly, p1
t must satisfy a variant of (3.2) in
which the strict inequality is replaced by a weak inequality.
When (3.2) holds, the maximum value of Q occurs for the value of ¹ ¼t such that
Q¹ ¼ = 0: This implies that the worst-case value of ¹ ¼t is the one given by (3.4) { (3.5)
in the text. Substituting this solution into (A.7) and (A.8), one obtains the implied
output gap (3.6) and and relative entropy (3.7) under the worst-case NRE beliefs,
39Equation (A.7) again assumes that p1
t 6= 0: In the event that p1
t = 0; it follows from the previous
footnote that the relative entropy of the worst-case beliefs will equal zero.
40The analysis here assumes that p1
t 6= 0: If p1
t = 0; there is no choice about the value of ¹ ¼t; it
must equal p0
t:
30as stated in the text. Substituting these expressions into the objective (A.1), one
obtains an objective for the CB of the form (3.8), in which the period loss is given by
L(¼t;pt;st) =
1
2
¼
2
t +
¸
2·2¢t
[¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t]
2; (A.10)
where ¢t is the function of p1
t de¯ned by (3.5).
When, instead, (3.2) holds with equality, and (A.9) holds as well, the worst-case
value of ¹ ¼t is indeterminate, but the maximized value of (A.1) is nonetheless well-
de¯ned, and equal to zero. In this case, the period loss function is equal to
L(¼t;pt;st) =
1
2
¼
2
t:
When neither this case nor the one discussed in the previous paragraph applies, we
can de¯ne L(¼t;pt;st) as being equal to +1. The function is then de¯ned (but
possibly equal to +1) for all possible values of its arguments.
Note also that L(¼t;pt;st) is necessarily non-negative, since for any values of the
arguments, it is possible for the \malevolent agent" to obtain a non-negative value
of (A.1) by choosing mt+1 = 1 in all states; the maximized value of (A.1) is then
necessarily at least this high. It follows that both the conditional expectations and
the in¯nite sum in (3.8) are sums (or integrals) of non-negative quantities; hence
both are well-de¯ned (though possibly equal to +1) for all possible values of the
arguments. Thus the CB objective (3.8) is well-de¯ned for arbitrary state-contingent
sequences fptg and an arbitrary initial condition (¼0;s0).
A.2 Robustly Optimal Linear Policy
Given the worst-case PS beliefs characterized in the previous section, the problem of
the CB is to choose a sequence fptg for all t ¸ 0 so as to minimize
E½E0
1 X
t=0
¯
tL(¼t;pt;st); (A.11)
where
¼t+1 = p
0
t + p
10
t wt+1 (A.12)
and
st+1 = Ast + Bwt+1 (A.13)
31for each t ¸ 0; and (¼0;s0) are given as initial conditions. Here E½ indicates an
integral over alternative possible initial conditions (p0
¡1;s¡1;w0) using a measure ½,
the choice of which is explained in the next section; and it is assumed that p1
¡1 = ¹ p1;
where the choice of ¹ p1 (a single value) is also explained in the next section. I use
the notation Et[¢] to indicate an expectation conditional upon the history ht; by
which I mean the particular initial conditions (p0
¡1;s¡1;w0) that have been drawn,
together with the subsequent realizations of the exogenous disturbances (w1;:::;wt):
I furthermore suppose that the CB's choice of p1
t must depend only on the date t,
while the choice of p0
t may depend on the history ht:
One can show that the objective (A.11) is a convex function of the sequence fptg. I
begin by noting that (A.1) is a convex function of ¼t and xt; for any choice of mt+1(¢):
Then since (A.2) is a linear relation among ¼t;xt; and ¼t+1(¢); it follows that, taking
as given the choice of mt+1(cdot); the value of (A.1) implied by any choice of ¼t+1(¢)
by the CB is a convex function of ¼t and ¼t+1(cdot): Similarly, since (A.12) is linear,
the value of (A.1) implied by any choice of pt is a convex function of ¼t and pt; for any
choice of mt+1(¢): Then since the maximum of a set of convex functions is a convex
function, it follows that the maximized value of (A.1) is also a convex function of
¼t and pt: Thus L(¼t;pt;st) is a convex function of (¼t;pt): Finally, a sum of convex
functions is convex; this, together with the linearity of (A.12), implies that (A.11) is
a convex function of the sequence fptg.
Convexity implies that the CB's optimal policy can be characterized by a system
of ¯rst-order conditions, according to which
L0(¼t;pt;st) + ¯EtL¼(¼t+1;pt+1;st+1) = 0 (A.14)
for each possible history ht at any date t ¸ 0; and
E½E0[L1(¼t;pt;st) + ¯L¼(¼t+1;pt+1;st+1)wt+1] = 0 (A.15)
for each date t ¸ 0: Here L¼ denotes @L=@¼; L0 denotes @L=@p0; and L1 denotes
@L=@p1: Condition (A.14) is the ¯rst-order condition for the optimal choice of p0
t,
and (A.15) is the corresponding condition for the optimal choice of p1
t. The latter
condition is required to hold only in its ex ante (or unconditional) expected value,
because I have de¯ned a linear policy as one under which p1
t does not depend on the
history of realization of the shocks.
32Note that it follows from the characterization in the previous section that for any
plan satisfying (3.2), the partial derivatives just referred to are well-de¯ned, and equal
to
L¼(¼t;pt;st) = ¼t +
¸
·2
¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t
¢t
;
L0(¼t;pt;st) = ¡¯
¸
·2
¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t
¢t
;
L1(¼t;pt;st) =
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 µ
¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t
¢t
¶2
p
1
t:
Substituting (A.12) for ¼t and (3.5) for ¢t in these expressions, one obtains the
¯rst-order conditions (A.14) { (A.15) as restrictions upon the sequence fptg.
As explained in the text, I wish to ¯nd a sequence of functions f't(¢)g and a value
¹ p1 such that the linear policy under which
p
0
t = 't(ht); p
1
t = ¹ p
1
for all t ¸ 0 satis¯es the ¯rst-order conditions (A.14) { (A.15), when the initial
measure ½ is the ergodic measure for the variables (p0
t;st;wt+1) under the policy just
speci¯ed, and in addition p1
¡1 = ¹ p1: I ¯rst show that there exists a state-contingent
evolution for fp0
tg that satis¯es (A.14) in the case of an arbitrary constant value
¹ p1 that satis¯es the bound (3.2), and for which there exists a well-de¯ned ergodic
measure. Using the ergodic measure ½ corresponding to a given value of ¹ p1; I then
determine the nonlinear equation that ¹ p1 must satisfy in order for (A.15) to hold each
period under the conjectured solution. Demonstration that a robustly optimal linear
policy exists then requires only that one show that there exists a solution ¹ p1 to this
equation that also satis¯es the bound (3.2).
Under the assumption that p1
t = ¹ p1 for all t ¸ ¡1; (A.14) is a stochastic linear
di®erence equation for the process fp0
tg of the form
Et[A(L)p
0
t+1] = vt; (A.16)
where
A(L) ´ ¯ ¡
µ
1 + ¯ +
·2 ¹ ¢
¸
¶
L + L
2;
vt ´ ut ¡ Etut+1 ¡ ¹ p
10wt:
33(Here ¹ ¢ is the constant value of ¢t implied by the constant value ¹ p1:) By factoring
the lag polynomial in (A.16), one can easily show that (A.16) has a unique stationary
solution, given by
p
0
t = ¹p
0
t¡1 ¡ ¹Et[(1 ¡ ¯¹L
¡1)
¡1vt]; (A.17)
where 0 < ¹ < 1 is the smaller root of the characteristic equation (3.13) given in the
text. Note that a stationary solution exists regardless of the value assumed for ¹ p1:
It is then straightforward to solve for the ergodic measure ½ associated with a given
value of ¹ p1:
Equation (A.17) is a solution for the dynamics of fp0
tg of the kind indicated by
equation (3.10) in the text. In the special case in which wt is a scalar and ut = ¾uwt;
vt = (¾u ¡ ¹ p1)wt; and (A.17) reduces to
p
0
t = ¹p
0
t¡1 ¡ ¹(¾u ¡ ¹ p
1)wt: (A.18)
Thus we have established conditions (3.11) given in the text. As noted in the text,
it is evident from (3.13) that ¹ is monotonically decreasing in ¹ ¢. Since a concern
for robustness results in ¹ ¢ < 1; while ¹ ¢ = 1 in the case of rational expectations, we
see that a concern for robustness results in a value of ¹ that is larger (closer to 1),
implying more persistence in the °uctuations in fp0
tg:
It remains to determine when condition (A.15) is also satis¯ed. I ¯rst observe
that
E½E0[L1(¼t;pt;st)] =
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 ¹ p1
¹ ¢2E[(¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t)
2]
=
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 ¹ p1
¹ ¢2[a + 2b¹ p
1 + (¹ p
1)
2];
where
a ´ E[(p
0
t¡1 ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t)
2];
b ´ E[wt(p
0
t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t)]:
Here E[¢] denotes the expectation under the ergodic measure associated with the
dynamics for fp0
tg indicated by (A.17) | which measure is uniquely de¯ned in the
case of a given value of ¹ p1:
Similarly, one can show that
E½E0[L¼(¼t+1;pt+1;st+1)wt+1] = E[¼t+1wt+1] +
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
E[(¼t+1 ¡ ut+1 ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t+1)wt+1]
= ¹ p
1 +
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
[¹ p
1 + b]:
34Hence condition (A.15) is equivalent to
f(¹ p
1) ´
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 c
¹ ¢2 ¹ p
1 + ¹ p
1 +
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
[¹ p
1 + b] = 0; (A.19)
where
c ´ a + 2b¹ p
1 + (¹ p
1)
2:
A robustly optimal linear policy then exists if and only if (A.19) has a solution ¹ p1
that satis¯es the bound (3.2). Of course, in de¯ning the function f(¢); one must take
account of the dependence of c and ¹ ¢ on the value of ¹ p1:
When fp0
tg evolves in accordance with the stationary dynamics (A.18), the above
de¯nitions imply that
a = (·x
¤)
2 + Ef[(1 ¡ ¯¹)p
0
t¡1 ¡ (¾u ¡ ¯¹(¾u ¡ ¹ p
1))wt]
2g
= (·x
¤)
2 +
(1 ¡ ¯¹)2¹2
1 ¡ ¹2 (¾u ¡ ¹ p
1)
2 + [(1 ¡ ¯¹)¾u + ¯¹¹ p
1]
2;
b = ¡¾u ¡ ¯E[p
0
twt]
= ¡(1 ¡ ¯¹)¾u ¡ ¯¹¹ p
1:
I furthermore observe that a = a0 + b2; where
a0 ´ (·x
¤)
2 +
(1 ¡ ¯¹)2¹2
1 ¡ ¹2 (¾u ¡ ¹ p
1)
2 > 0:
Hence
c = a0 + (b + ¹ p
1)
2 > 0
can be signed for all admissible values of ¹ p1: Substituting this function of ¹ p1 for c and
(3.5) for ¹ ¢ in (A.19) yields a nonlinear equation in ¹ p1, that is solved numerically in
order to produce Figure 1.
One can easily show that a solution to this equation in the admissible range must
exist. Note ¯rst that (3.2) can alternatively be written in the form
j¹ p
1j < ^ p
1 ´
·
¸
1=2
µ
1=2
¯
: (A.20)
I next observe that
f(0) =
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
b = ¡
¸
·2(1 ¡ ¯¹)¾u < 0:
35On the other hand, in the case of any ¯nite µ; as p1 ! ^ p1; the ¯rst term in the
expression (A.19) becomes larger than the other two terms, so that f(p1) > 0 for
any value of p1 close enough to (while still below) the bound, Since the function
f(¢) is well-de¯ned and continuous on the entire interval [0; ^ p1), there must be an
intermediate value 0 < ¹ p1 < ^ p1 at which f(¹ p1) = 0: Such a value satis¯es both (3.2)
and (A.19), and so describes a robustly optimal linear policy.
It remains to establish (3.12) and (3.14). When evaluated at the value p1 = ¹¾u;
the second two terms in (A.19) are equal to
¡
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
P(¹)¾u = 0;
where P(¹) is the polynomial de¯ned in (3.13). Moreover, in the limiting case in
which µ ! 1 (the RE case), the ¯rst term in condition (A.19) is identically zero,
so that f(¹¾u) = 0; and ¹ p1 = ¹¾u is a solution.41 Instead, when µ is ¯nite, the ¯rst
term is necessarily positive, so that f(¹¾u) > 0: If ¹¾u < ^ p1; this implies that there
exists a solution to (A.15) such that 0 < ¹ p1 < ¹¾u; as asserted in (3.14). If instead
^ p1 · ¹¾u; then (3.14) follows from the result in the previous paragraph. Hence in
either case, the robustly optimal policy satis¯es (3.14) for any ¯nite µ:
A.3 An Alternative Objective for the Robust Policymaker
In the analysis presented above, it is assumed that the robust policymaker seeks to
minimize precisely the same objective (2.4) that the \malevolent agent" seek to max-
imize through its choice of distorted beliefs for the private sector. This corresponds
to the kind of robust decision problem that Hansen and Sargent (2005, chap. 6)
call a \multiplier robust control problem," and to the kind of generalized ambiguity
aversion characterized by Maccheroni et al. (2004, 2005). Here, instead, I show how
the results would di®er in the case of the alternative objective assumed in Woodford
(2005).
One might alternatively suppose that the policymaker ranks alternative equilibria
according to the value of the original loss function (2.2), even though the malevolent
agent is expected to prefer the highest possible value of (2.4). The reasoning would be
41It is easily seen to be the unique solution, since f(p) is linear in this case. One can also show
that this is the optimal policy without restricting attention to linear policies, as is done here; see
Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
36the following. The policymaker is worried about possible outcomes (due to distorted
beliefs) that are especially bad in terms of his objective (2.2), but less worried if the
distortion of beliefs required is one that should be relatively easily discon¯rmed by
observation. The worst-case outcome that is feared, in the case of a given policy, is
therefore the one that maximizes (2.4). However, when the policymaker considers
which policy is least unfortunate under these worst-case beliefs, he ranks the worst-
case equilibria associated with alternative policies according to the value of (2.2) in
each. The policymaker is concerned by the possibility of an equilibrium with large
departures of in°ation and/or the output gap from their optimal values, and does
not regard it as a mitigating factor that such an equilibrium might involve large
expectational errors on the part of the private sector. Ranking outcomes by the value
of (2.4) suggests instead that the policymaker is not bothered by failure to stabilize
in°ation and the output gap, as long as the failure depends on a su±ciently large
distortion of PS beliefs.
This modi¯cation of the assumed objective of robust policy has the consequence
that the \game" between the policymaker and the malevolent agent is no longer zero-
sum, which prevents us from using a number of devices that are frequently employed
in Hansen and Sargent (2005); for example, we cannot characterize optimal policy
by the ¯rst-order conditions for an optimal policy commitment in the case of the
particular distorted beliefs fmt+1g that are chosen by the malevolent agent.42 But
the method used above to characterize robustly optimal policy assumes a \game" in
which the CB is a Stackelberg \leader" and takes into account the optimal response
of the malevolent agent, and as a result it is not hard to explain how the calculations
would be modi¯ed in the case of the alternative objective.
The characterization of worst-case NRE beliefs in section A.1 remains applicable,
since the malevolent agent again seeks to maximize (2.4). However, rather than
substituting the above solutions for mt+1(wt+1) and xt into (A.1), one substitutes
them instead into a period loss function that omits the ¯nal (relative-entropy) term.
Again one obtains an objective for the CB of the form (3.8), but now the period loss
42Thus a characterization of robustly optimal policy by a coupled system of Euler equations for the
decisionmaker and the malevolent agent respectively, as in \game 1" of Hansen and Sargent (2005,
chap. 6), is not possible in this case, though it would be possible for the robust policy problem
stated in the text.
37is given by
L(¼t;pt;st) =
1
2
¼
2
t +
¸
2·2¢2
t
[¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x
¤ ¡ ¯p
0
t]
2; (A.21)
rather than (A.10). (Here ¢t is again the function of p1
t de¯ned by (3.5).) Note
that the qualitative conclusion about how the CB's objective is a®ected by a concern
for robustness remains the same as before: the relative weight on the second term
in (A.21) is increased the smaller is µ, because (for any given linear policy in which
p1
t 6= 0) ¢t becomes a smaller positive quantity as µ is reduced. The fact that ¢t is
replaced by ¢2
t in (A.21) only means that the e®ect is even stronger in the case of
this version of the robust policy problem. (Under the present objective, the worse
outcome for the output gap is no longer partially mitigated by the fact that PS beliefs
are also more distorted in the case of lower µ:)43 As before, the period loss (A.21)
becomes unboundedly large as jp1
tj approaches the upper bound (3.2), so that we
conclude once again that robustly optimal policy must satisfy this bound.
The robustly optimal linear policy is again a choice of fptg (subject to the con-
straints discussed above) to minimize the objective (3.8), except that the period loss
is now given by (A.21). The solution to this problem can again be characterized as
in section A.2. The ¯rst-order conditions for optimal CB policy are again of the form
(A.14) { (A.15), but now the partial derivatives of L are equal to
L¼(¼t;pt;st) = ¼t +
¸
·2
¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t
¢2
t
;
L0(¼t;pt;st) = ¡¯
¸
·2
¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t
¢2
t
;
L1(¼t;pt;st) = 2
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 (¼t ¡ ut ¡ ·x¤ ¡ ¯p0
t)2
¢3
t
p
1
t:
43The discussion here assumes that policy satis¯es the bound (3.2). As above, if the inequality
(3.2) is reversed, or it holds with equality and policy does not also satisfy (A.9), the malevolent
agent chooses an extreme distortion of beliefs and the CB's period loss is unboundedly large. In the
case that (3.2) holds with equality and (A.9) is precisely satis¯ed, the malevolent agent is indi®erent
among a set of distortions which are not all equally bad for the CB. In this case, the set of possible
outcomes that might equally be chosen by the malevolent agent include ones in which the period loss
of the CB is unboundedly large. Because we assume that the policy analyst should be concerned with
the worst-case possible outcomes for her principal, it is reasonable to assign the CB loss function a
value of +1 in this case as well. The CB loss function is then de¯ned for all possible linear policies,
and it is evident that a robustly optimal policy will necessarily satisfy (3.2).
38Condition (A.14) again implies that the process fp0
tg must satisfy a stochastic
linear di®erence equation of the form (A.16), except that we now de¯ne
A(L) ´ ¯ ¡
µ
1 + ¯ +
·2 ¹ ¢2
¸
¶
L + L
2:
(The de¯nition of vt remains as before.) The unique stationary solution to (A.16) is
again of the form (A.17), and again 0 < ¹ < 1; but now ¹ is the smaller root of the
characteristic equation
P(¹) ´ ¯¹
2 ¡
µ
1 + ¯ +
·2 ¹ ¢2
¸
¶
¹ + 1 = 0 (A.22)
rather than of equation (3.13) in the text. Again one ¯nds that a stationary solution
exists regardless of the value of ¹ p1; allowing one to de¯ne the ergodic measure ½
associated with any given value of ¹ p1; and once again the stationary °uctuations occur
around a long-run mean in°ation rate of zero. Since (A.22) is the same as (3.13),
except that ¹ ¢ is replaced by ¹ ¢2; one again observes that the root ¹ is monotonically
decreasing in ¹ ¢; so that a concern for robustness increases the persistence of the
°uctuations in fp0
tg. In the special case of i.i.d. cost-push shocks, (A.17) again
reduces to (A.18), establishing conditions (3.11) given in the text.
Condition (A.15) again implies a condition of the form f(¹ p1) = 0; but now we
de¯ne
f(¹ p
1) ´ 2
¯
2
µ
µ
¸
·2
¶2 c
¹ ¢3 ¹ p
1 + ¹ p
1 +
¸
·2 ¹ ¢2[¹ p
1 + b] = 0: (A.23)
Here the de¯nition of c is as before, and one can again show that c > 0 for all
admissible values of ¹ p1: One can again show that in the case of any ¯nite µ; f(0) < 0;
while f(p1) > 0 for any p1 close enough to (while still less than) the bound ^ p1: Hence
a solution 0 < ¹ p1 < ^ p1 exists, corresponding to a robustly optimal linear policy of the
kind described in the text. Figure 4 shows how ¹ p1 varies with parameters in the case
of the same numerical values as in Figure 1. Note that the qualitative conclusions
from this exercise are the same as before; quantitatively, we see that a given degree
of concern for robustness (i.e., a given value of µ) reduces the optimal sensitivity
of in°ation to the cost-push disturbances to an even greater extent when the CB is
assumed to evaluate worst-case outcomes using (2.2).
One can also establish once again that the robustly optimal linear policy must
satisfy (3.14). When evaluated at p1 = ¹¾u; the second two terms in the function
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Figure A.1: Variation of ¹ p1 with ¾u; under alternative degrees of concern for robust-
ness, for the alternative CB objective.
de¯ned in (A.23) are again equal to
¡
¸
·2 ¹ ¢
P(¹)¾u = 0;
where P(¹) is now de¯ned in (A.22), so that once again f(¹¾u) > 0: Thus it again
follows that there exists a solution to (A.23) with 0 < ¹ p1 < ¹¾u: Since the cumulative
log price increase due to a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock is again given by
(3.15), this result again implies that with a concern for robustness, the initial price
increase due to a positive cost-push shock is not merely eventually undone, but is
eventually reversed in sign, under the optimal linear policy.
In the case of discretionary policy, use of the alternative CB objective similarly
leaves the qualitative conclusions announced in the text unchanged. The same argu-
ment as in the text can be used to show that ¹ ¼(st) is the solution to equation (4.2),
except that now the function L is the one de¯ned in (A.21), rather than the one
40de¯ned in (A.10). The solution is then given by
¹ ¼(st) =
¸
·2 ¹ ¢ + ¸
[·x
¤ + ut + ¯¹ p
0(st)]:
rather than by (4.6). Again we have a linear solution of the form (4.3), and the
expressions given in (4.7) { (4.8) continue to apply, if the factor ¹ ¢ is replaced by ¹ ¢2
in each equation.
Because ¹ ¢2 is a decreasing, strictly concave function of ¹ p1 just as ¹ ¢ is, and
similarly varies from 1 to 0 as ¹ p1 increases from 0 to ^ p1; the qualitative conclusions
obtained in Appendix A.4 continue to apply in the case of the alternative objective;
thus, for example, a large enough value of · will once again result in the three regions
shown in Figure 4. Details of the corresponding calculations for the alternative case
are omitted.
A.4 Existence and Stability of Robust Linear MPE
A robust linear MPE corresponds to a pair (¹ p1; ¹ ¢) that satisfy equations (¯xpt1)
{ (¯xpt2), with ¹ ¢ > 0 so that (3.2) is satis¯ed. Equivalently, we are looking for
solutions to the two equations in the interval 0 < ¹ p1 < ^ p1; where ^ p1 is de¯ned by
(A.20).
If we write these equations as ¹ ¢ = ¢1(¹ p1) and ¹ ¢ = ¢2(¹ p1) respectively, we observe
that ¢1(p) is a decreasing, strictly concave function for all p > 0; while ¢2(p) is a
decreasing, strictly convex function over the same domain. Moreover, ¢1(p) < ¢2(p)
for all small enough p > 0 (as ¢2(p) ! +1 as p ! 0), and also for all large enough
p (as ¢1(p) ! ¡1 as p ! +1). Hence there are either no intersections of the two
curves with ¹ p1 > 0; or two intersections, or a single intersection at a point of tangency
between the two curves.
The slopes of the two curves are furthermore given by
¢
0
1(p) = ¡2
¯
2
µ
¸
·2p;
¢
0
2(p) = ¡
¸
·2
¾u
p2 :
From these expressions one observes that ¢0
2(p) is less than, equal to, or greater than
¢0
1(p) according to whether p is less than, equal to, or greater than ~ p1; where
~ p
1 ´
µ
µ
¯
2
¾u
2
¶1=3
> 0:
41From this it follows that there are two intersections if and only if ¢2(~ p1) < ¢1(~ p1);
which holds if and only if ¾u < ¾¤
u; where ¾¤
u is de¯ned as in (4.11).44 Similarly, the
two curves are tangent to each other if and only if ¾u = ¾¤
u; in this case, the unique
intersection is at ¹ p1 = ~ p1: And ¯nally, the two curves fail to intersect if and only if
¾u > ¾¤
u:
It remains to consider how many of these intersections occur in the interval 0 <
¹ p1 < ^ p1: One notes that there is exactly one solution in that interval (and hence
a unique robust linear MPE) if and only if ¢2(^ p1) < 0; which holds if and only if
¾u < ^ p1: When ¾u = ^ p1 exactly, ¢2(^ p1) = ¢1(^ p1) = 0; and the curves intersect at
¹ p1 = ^ p1: This is the larger of two solutions for ¹ p1 if and only if
¢
0
1(^ p
1) < ¢
0
2(^ p
1); (A.24)
which holds if and only if ¸·2 < 2: In this case, as ¾u is increased further, the larger
of the two solutions for ¹ p1 decreases with ¾u; so that there are two solutions in the
interval (0; ^ p1); until ¾u = ¾¤; and the two solutions collapse into one, as the curves
are tangent. (Note that ¾¤
u > ^ p1:) For still larger values of ¾u; there is no intersection,
as explained in the previous paragraph.
If instead, ¸=·2 = 2 exactly, then the curves are tangent when ¾u = ^ p1 (which
in this case is also equal to ¾¤
u). At this point the only intersection occurs at ¹ p1 =
^ p1 (which fails to satisfy condition (3.2)), and for larger values of ¾u there are no
intersections. Finally, if ¸=·2 > 2; then the inequality in (A.24) is reversed, and
when ¾u = ^ p1; the intersection at ¹ p1 = ^ p1 is the smaller of the two solutions. (The
smaller solution approaches ^ p1 from below as ¾u increases to ^ p1:) In this case, there
are no solutions ¹ p1 < ^ p1 when ¾u = ^ p1: As ¾u increases further, the smaller solution
continues to increase with ¾u; so that even for values of ¾u that continue to be less
than or equal to ¾¤
u (so that the curves continue to intersect), there are no solutions
with ¹ p1 < ^ p1: And for still larger values of ¾u; there are again no solutions at all.
Hence in each case, the number of solutions is as described in the text.
The \expectational stability" analysis proposed in the text involves the properties
of the map
©(p) ´ ¢
¡1
2 (¢1(p)):
Formally, a ¯xed point ¹ p1 of © (which corresponds to an intersection of the two curves
studied above) is expectationally stable if and only if there exists a neighborhood P
44It is useful to note that this de¯nition implies that ¾¤
u ¸ ^ p1; with equality only if ·2=¸ = 1=2:
42of ¹ p1 such that
lim
n!1
©
n(p) = ¹ p
1
for any p 2 P: Our observations above about the functions ¢1(¢);¢2(¢) imply that
©(¢) is a monotonically increasing function. Hence a ¯xed point ¹ p1 is stable if and
only if ©0(¹ p1) < 1:
The above de¯nition implies that
©
0(p) =
¢0
1(p)
¢0
2(¢
¡1
2 (¢1(p)))
> 0:
Evaluated at a ¯xed point of ©; this reduces to
©
0(¹ p
1) =
¢0
1(¹ p1)
¢0
2(¹ p1)
:
Hence the stability condition is satis¯ed if and only if
¢
0
2(¹ p
1) < ¢
0
1(¹ p
1) < 0: (A.25)
Because of the concavity of ¢1(¢) and the convexity of ¢2(¢); this condition necessarily
holds at the ¯xed point with the smaller value of ¹ p1, and not at the higher value.
Hence in Figure 4, it is the upper (dashed) branch of solutions that is expectationally
unstable, while the lower (solid) branch of solutions is stable. We therefore conclude
that regardless of the other parameter values, there is exactly one expectationally
stable robust linear MPE for all values of ¾u below some positive critical value, and
no robust linear MPE for values of ¾u greater than or equal to that value.
Finally, let us consider the way in which ¹ p1 changes as µ is reduced (indicating
that a broader range of NRE beliefs are considered possible). Letting ¹ p1 be implicitly
de¯ned by the equation
¢1(¹ p
1) = ¢2(¹ p
1);
the implicit function theorem implies that
d¹ p1
dµ
= ¡
@¢1=@µ
¢0
1 ¡ ¢0
2
: (A.26)
It follows from (A.25) that in the case of an expectationally stable MPE, the denom-
inator of the fraction in (A.26) is positive. We also observe that
@¢1
@µ
=
¯
2
µ
2
¸
·2(¹ p
1)
2 > 0;
43so that the numerator is positive as well, and hence ¹ p1 decreases as µ increases. This
means that ¹ p1 increases as the CB's concern for robustness increases (corresponding to
a lower value of µ; up until the point where there ceases to any longer be a robust linear
MPE at all. In that case, as discussed in the text, we can think of the equilibrium
sensitivity of in°ation to cost-push shocks as being unbounded; so the conclusion
that greater concern for robustness leads to greater sensitivity of in°ation to cost-
push shocks extends, in a looser sense, to that case as well.
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